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THE POLITICS OF FINANCIAL REGULATION
Sanaa Ahmed*
In a world where the dominant dynamic of economic regulation is one
of deregulation, 1 financial-sector standards such as prudential
regulations, accounting standards, as well as the regulation of corruption,
securities, and money laundering have been ratcheted up and most
countries have complied meekly. Why?
The answer to this question lies in the ‘how’. This paper argues that the
increasing currency of global standards and regulations are an indication
of the pervasive nature of control exercised by the regulators. By setting
up a protective, technicality-centred discourse around financial
regulation, the regulators characterise it as an essentially technical and
apolitical matter, and use the characterisation to infer legitimacy for
themselves as disinterested and skilled technicians. It is argued that the
nature of regulation – the structuring of a regulatory web, the
governance structures of regulatory institutions, as well as the
enforcement mechanisms deployed – preclude any meaningful

*
1

Sanaa Ahmed is a journalist who writes on legal and political issues. She holds an LLM from the
University of Warwick and an LLB from the University of Karachi.
I rely on Braithwaite & Drahos’ understanding of ‘regulation’ as an umbrella term for rules,
norms, standards and guidelines. Financial regulation, as Braithwaite & Drahos see it, pertains
primarily to the regulation of banks and non-bank financial institutions, money laundering,
companies and securities firms, insurance, and taxation. They do recognise, however, that the
procedural application of such regulation also brings standards related to accounting, auditing,
corporate governance, and payments systems into the ambit of financial regulation. Comparatively,
the joint IMF-World Bank Financial Sector Assessment programme also adds data dissemination,
fiscal transparency, insolvency and creditor rights, monetary, and financial policy transparency
to this list as standards and codes that must be monitored for effective regulation of financial
systems. Braithwaite & Drahos’ use of the term ‘deregulation’ contrasts with that of other
authors such as Hardt and Negri who argue that free markets do not feature less political control
and intervention but merely those of a different kind. The process would then qualify as ‘reregulation’. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION (2000); MICHAEL
HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, MULTITUDE 168 (2004).
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accountability. This paper submits that this control is symptomatic of a
new kind of political control and contends that its aims must be
interrogated.

INTRODUCTION
The most remarkable feature of global financial regulation2 is the difficulty in
holding any one institution or regulator responsible for it. There is a vast and
rich body of literature interrogating the normative commitments, the underlying
ideology, and the politics informing the governance of the global political
economy.3 Contemporary scholarship has problematised various aspects of global
economic governance, its components – international trade and investment,
development, and debt – as well as its implications for the subaltern: who is
regulating whom, on whose behalf, why and how, and to what effect. In each
instance, the implementing institutions and the authors of regulation, such as the
World Trade Organisation (WTO), International Financial Institutions (IFIs) or
transnational corporations, as well as the interests they represent, are easily
identifiable. There is a distinct body of ‘rules’ with clearly defined consequences
for non-compliance. There is a fierce debate on and contestation of the regulatory
power wielded by these organisations, as well as their enforcement capabilities.
Finally, the debilitating economic, social, and political consequences of these
decisions are widely recognised. Animating these debates are concerns regarding
the accountability, legitimacy, and transparency of these institutions and their
decision-making processes, as well as the consequent impact on national sovereignty
and democracy in the developing South.

2

3

Braithwaite & Drahos define the globalisation of financial regulation as “the spread of some set
of regulatory norms”. See BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 1, at 8. As they see it, globalisation
operates at the level of specific rules and at the level of general principles. Distinguishing principles
and standards are the facts that standards are used as measures of conduct and can have a high
level of specificity. See BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 1, at 19. The scope of this article,
however, precludes such a distinction.
See generally Saskia Sassen, Sundhya Pahuja, Sol Picciotto, Stephen Gill, David Schneiderman,
and James Thuo Gathhi. ‘Global political economy’ here is understood as the interaction of the
market and actors such as states, multinational corporations and international organisations. See
ROBERT GILPIN, GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: UNDERSTANDING THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
ORDER (2001).
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Despite being a crucial component of international trade, global financial regulation
has thus far escaped similar, significant, and sustained problematisation.4This is
partly due to its nature – it is hard to identify a single author and locate specific
interests within multiple global regulatory bodies, harder to contest voluntary
standards, and meaningless to resist where there is neither overt enforcement nor
penalty.
However, the most significant impediment to meaningful debate about financial
regulation stems primarily from the protective discourse surrounding it. This
discourse characterises financial regulation as an essentially technical and apolitical
matter. Consequently, global regulators and standard-setting bodies emerge as
disinterested and skilled technicians, not established political actors with wellentrenched interests who assert power to achieve their own objectives.
This discourse then persuades the few critics of financial regulation, as well as the
regulated, to side with the regulatory agencies. Most seem convinced that regulation
is good, more regulation is better, and the drafting of ‘necessary’ technical
procedures to prevent financial contagion5 or systemic risk6 is best left to the
global experts. Dissent is mostly limited to the form – transparency, accountability,

4
5

6

For useful discussions on financial regulation, see generally, Julia Black, Chris Brummer, Emily
Lee, Rolf Weber and Antonio Segura-Serrano.
Contagion occurs when cross-border capital flows transmit economic shocks. Contagion may be
divided into two forms: economic contagion, which occurs through trade and investment flows,
and pure contagion, which arises from changing risk appetite among investors and can lead to
reverse capital flows from emerging markets. See KERN ALEXANDER ET AL., GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
OF FINANCIAL SYSTEMS: THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC REGULATION OF SYSTEMIC RISK (2005).
Precise definitions of systemic risk are hard to come by, although, as the phrase suggests, the
phenomenon has to do with the risk posed to the functioning of the financial system. Wilmarth,
for example, defines it as “the risk that the failure of a major financial institution will severely
disrupt the financial system and will have adverse ‘spill over’ effects on the general economy”. See
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Controlling systemic risk in an era of financial consolidation, (2002),
http://www.imf.org/external/np/leg/sem/2002/cdmfl/eng/wilmar.pdf; comparatively,
Alexander et al. define systemic risk as “arising from the mispricing of risk in financial markets,
which often means that risk is under-priced in relation to its costs and that the under pricing of
risk results in too much of it being created in financial markets” can arise from problems with
payment and settlement systems or from some type of financial failure that induces a
macroeconomic crisis. See ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 5, at 23. Systemic risk inherent to
international banking includes global systemic risk (the risk that the failure of one significant
bank will cause the collapse of the entire banking system); safety and solvency risks that arise
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et al7 – rather than the substance of regulation; to the procedural difficulties in
operation rather than governance itself.8
This paper argues that this two-fold convergence between various national
regulatory regimes, as well as the alignment of the proponents and criticsis
symptomatic of a carefully concealed and insidious power. To quote Hardt and
Negri in a different context, “[not] less political control but merely a different
kind of political control”.9
The study of global financial regulation as a technique of power is fascinating,
precisely because the regulators, regulations, and the processes of decision-making
are as ‘flawed’ as those of international trade, or multilateral lending. But, a
prudential regulation10 proposed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(Basel Committee) still lacks the emotive resonance or the proclivity towards being
contested of a WTO-endorsed TRIPs regime or an IMF-sponsored conditionality.
The ‘illegitimacy’ of the incumbent regime has not impeded, let alone prevented,
increasing convergence of ‘minimum’ regulatory standards.
However, the increasing currency of financial-sector standards, such as prudential
regulations, accounting standards, as well as the regulation of corruption, securities,
and money laundering are not a testament to their inherent salubriousness but to

7
8

9
10

from imprudent lending and trading activity, and the risks to depositors through the lack of
adequate bank insurance. Systemic risk matters because high levels can lead to bank failures,
which can, in turn, pose a threat to the financial system and the broader economy. This is because
banks play an important role in payments and clearing systems; bank failures have an underlying
potential for a bank run; and the threat of contagion due to the interconnected nature of banks.
Ex ante measures to manage systemic risk include capital adequacy requirements, large exposure
limits and limitations on lending while ex post measures include deposit insurance and the lender
of last resort function.
See, for example, Michele Frantianni & John Pattison, International Financial Architecture and
International Financial Standards, 579 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 183 (2002).
For a lucid account of the procedural problems with global financial governance, see Jonathan
Ward, The New Basel Accord and Developing Countries: Problems and Alternatives, CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY (2002), http://www.cerf.cam.ac.uk/publications/files/Ward04.pdf, and ALEXANDER
ET AL., supra note 5.
HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 1, at 168.
The purpose of prudential regulations is to help banks and other non-bank financial intermediaries
manage various types of risk such as credit, concentration, market, settlement, liquidity and
operational risk. ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 5, at 24.
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the pervasive nature of control exercised. This discipline is both external (as enforced
by the official sector11 and the market) and internal (the self-disciplining involved
in complying with international ‘best practices’12). Compliance is secured through
the use of sophisticated disciplinary techniques such as watch listing, 13
conditionality, 14 and intrusive surveillance, 15 not unwieldy and obvious
enforcement mechanisms such as trade sanctions, or withheld loans.
This paper is structured into three sections. Part 1 advances the normative argument
of why financial regulation qualifies as a political, and not a technical issue, while
Part 2 offers a historical overview of the evolution of global financial markets and
regulation. Part 3 then moves into a discussion of the specific features of
contemporary regulation that enable regulators to exercise stringent control and
effect the global harmonisation of rules, regulations and standards.It is argued
that the unproven utility of financial regulation, the democratic deficit in the
devising of regulation, coupled with the pervasive nature exercised by regulators
make it necessary to examine whether global financial regulation is really as
worthwhile a project as it is made out to be.

I. FINANCIAL REGULATION: POLITICAL OR TECHNICAL?
Financial regulation matters. Regulatory rules for financial intermediaries define
the relationship between the stock of financial assets and overall liquidity. This,
in turn, affects aggregate demand, output, employment, and the spending ability
of individuals, firms, and governments.16 A bank forced to adhere to higher capital
adequacy requirements17 lends less to individuals, businesses, and the government
for ploughing into the productive economy. Fewer goods are produced, fewer
jobs are created, and fewer roads are built. A bourse with overly stringent criteria
for listing limits the ability of firms to raise capital, thereby constraining the

11
12
13
14
15

The phrase refers to the IMF and World Bank as distinguished from the private sector.
Antony Anghie, Time present and Time Past: Globalisation, International Financial Institutions
and the Third World, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 243, 286 (2000).
BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 1, at 28.
Sundhya Pahuja, Technologies of Empire: IMF Conditionality and the Reincription of the North/
South Divide, 13 LEIDEN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 749 (2000).
ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 5, at 36.
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amount they consume and produce, the number of people they employ, and so
on. A country featured on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) blacklist
finds it difficult to make payments to its trading partners,18 which limits the amount
of capital goods it can import. Financial factors are thus at the core of overall
economic performance. 19 Consequently, as Picciotto argues, they have
“(re)distributional consequences or implications”20 far beyond what is envisaged
by a “technicist view of social management”.21
Contemporary global financial regulation is problematic on both the conceptual
and the operational level. On the conceptual level, as Picciotto reasons, regulations
which impact “livelihoods, health and living standards” are necessarily political in
character. As such, assigning their formulationto an unelected ‘technical’ body
runs counter to democratic practices.22 Secondly, despite deep official sector inroads
on state sovereignty in many developing countries, economic policy formation
and finance ministries are still essentially ‘political’. Why should financial policies
and central banks then be segregated from politics, especially when regulation
affects the prospects of democracy as well?23

16
17

18

19
20
21
22
23

ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 5, at 5.
A capital adequacy ratio is the amount of capital that financial institutions are required to
maintain against their outstanding loans. This is not to be confused with reserve requirements,
which are the amount of money a financial institution must hold against the deposits made by
its customers. The former is a provision against risk while the latter is a provisioning for
expected losses (for example, bad loans). CARs are prescribed by the Basel Committee, while
the reserve requirements are usually specified by central banks.
This is because dollar payments around the world are cleared through New York and banks
there are ‘discouraged’ from doing business with FATF-categorised Non Cooperative
Countries and Territories (NCCTs) or otherwise ‘undesirable’ countries. For example, a
Citibanker confessed that his bank was “actively discouraging” its people from opening
correspondent accounts from Pakistan even though Pakistan is not an NCCT. Interview
with an employee of Citibank, in London, (January, 2005).
ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 5, at 5.
Sol Picciotto, Liberalisation and Democratisation: the Forum and the Hearth in the Era of
Cosmopolitan Post-Industrial Capitalism, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157, 177 (2000).
Id., at 160.
These include the principles of transparency, accountability and legitimacy etc.
Robert P. Delonis, International Financial Standards and Codes: Mandatory Regulation
Without Representation, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL 563, 623 (2004). She is referring
particularly to the water riots in Cochabamba.
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS
The justification for the depoliticised nature of financial regulation can be located
in the process of its historical evolution. The rapid globalisation of banks and
financial markets during the 1960s and 1970s were not accompanied by a
corresponding harmonisation of regulatory standards24 until the German bank,
Bankhaus Herstatt folded in 1974.
The demise of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s was significant for
the banking sector in that it resulted in the privatisation of foreign exchange
risk.25 The private sector, in turn, pressured governments for greater liberalisation
and fewer capital controls. But Herstatt demonstrated the downside of this greater
interconnectedness.26 The bankwas overexposed in the foreign currency market
and speculative activities regarding the movement of the dollar rate created crippling
losses. Had the German regulators not decided to honour Herstatt’s obligations,
five banks in the US would have folded as a result.27 At the same time, the BritishIsrael Bank in London was closed for insolvency problems and the Franklin
National Bank in the US followed suit soon after.28 Like the German authorities,
the US Federal Reserve also had to step in to guarantee the bank’s failed shortterm forex commitments in order to prevent the crisis from spreading.29 Systemic
risk and contagion had been born.
The bank failures were widely attributed to the lack of an adequate regulatory
structure which could protect against financial risk.30 The cross-border lending
24
25

26
27
28
29
30

BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 1, at 103.
In the absence of a fixed exchange rate system, banks with a high degree of concentration in the
area of foreign trade payments were vulnerable to the vagaries of the foreign exchange (forex)
markets. Bank failures in mature economies, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, BASEL, http:/
/www.bis.org/publ/bcbs_wp13.pdf. To minimise potential losses from forex dealings, banks
plumped for hedging strategies involving the diversification of assets into multiple currencies and
the creation of portfolios held in foreign and offshore jurisdictions. ALEXANDERETAL., supra note
5, at 22.
Fraitianni & Pattison, supra note 7, at 184.
ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 5, at 22.
For the period 1980-95, Fratianni & Pattison estimate an average rate of banking crises at 1.44
a year. Fraitianni & Pattison, supra note 7, at 184.
ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 5, at 22.
ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 5, at 22.
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and borrowing activities of multinational banks had created a two fold problem.
First, since no single regulator had jurisdiction over the entire international banking
system,31 they found it difficult to manage systemic risk on their own.32 Secondly,
regulators usually had poor quality information regarding the international
operations of domestic banks.33
To address the collective action and information problems described above, the
G-10 regulators and central bankers met at Basel in 1975 to form the Basel
Committee for Banking Supervision. This was the first global standard-setting
body. The self-confessed initial aim was to “close gaps in the supervisory net”34
through international cooperation but the “wider objective” was to “improve
supervisory understanding and the quality of banking supervision”.35 These goals
were to be met by exchanging information on national supervisory arrangements;
improving the “effectiveness of techniques for supervising international banking
business”; and setting minimum supervisory standards in “desirable” areas.36 The
resulting Basel Concordat was a set of “voluntary, legally non-binding, international
standards and rules of prudential supervision for the regulation of financial
institutions, payment systems and foreign exchange markets” designed to apply
to just the G-10 countries.37

III. THE PRESENT FACE OF REGULATION: THINK LOCAL, ACT GLOBAL
Three aspects of contemporary global financial regulation require particular
explication: the politics informing their devise; the prevalent means of effecting
31
32
33
34

33
36
37

BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 1, at 103.
This is because of high transaction costs and undefined property rights. ALEXANDER ET AL., supra
note 5, at 34.
BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 1, at 103.
This was based on two basic principles: to ensure that no banking establishment “escaped”
supervision, and that this supervision is “adequate”. Apart from the decidedly criminal connotations
of the use of the word escape, it also needs to be remembered that first, Basel didn’t apply to apply
all banks then and second, “adequate” was also decided by the G-10. A Brief History of the Basel
Committee, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.pdf.
Id. (emphasis added).
Supra note 34.
ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 5, at 35.
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regulatory convergence; and the consequent impact on accountability. Each aspect
is discussed in greater detail in the sub-sections that follow.
First, the phrase ‘think local, act global’ is employed in two senses here. First, it
refers to the politicisation of global regulation – the transfiguration of a domestic
political agenda into a global one. In its second sense, it refers to the assumption
of global regulatory control by region-specific regulators and describes how that
control is exercised and propagated. Put another way, the devise of global
regulation is not a linear process and the assumption of worldwide standard setting
responsibilities by region-specific regulatory agenciesis just one part of that process.
Secondly, a significant method of effecting regulatory convergence has multiple
agencies simultaneously issuing similar, overlapping regulations that are more often
than not, replicas of each other. Enabling these processes are the governance
structures of these agencies, which show a preponderance of powerful members
from the global North. Also relevant here is a discussion of the multiple
enforcement mechanisms employed to give effect to the standards. It is the complex
interplay of all these factors simultaneously that makes ‘global’ regulation possible.
The final sub-section elaborates on the fact thatthe combined operation of the
above also makes it impossible to enforce accountability in global financial
regulation and carries important consequences for global governance.
The Politicisation of Regulation
The USA and the Basel Committee are good examples of how domestic policy
imperatives can be brought to bear on global standards.The modus operandi for
the committee was to evolve an informal consensus on a ‘best practice’ – a
commitment the committee still honours – and allow members the freedom to
implement it according to the peculiarities of their national systems.38 Although
the term ‘best practice’ carries connotations of neutrality and technical superiority,
the standards and guidelines issued by the committee were as deeply politicised as
any other. The first illustration of how a ‘best practice’ could be moulded according
to domestic political imperatives came in 1988.
The 1980s were a bad time for the banking industry in the USA. The Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation had to resolve some 1,650 federally insured banks
and the Savings and Loans crisis of the early 1980s saw the failure of 1,320 financial
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institutions.39 Widespread public agitation in the wake of these crises prompted
the US Congress to pass a law in 1983 requiring banking agencies to ensure that
all banks were adequately capitalised.40 The Savings and Loans crisis data suggested
that “adequate” was eight per cent of the outstanding loan amount and that was
the number the Congress endorsed.
The move allayed the fears of the electorate but made the banking constituency
extremely unhappy. American bankers argued that the mandatory capital adequacy
requirements placed them at a distinct disadvantage to foreign banks.41 The US
obligingly carried these concerns to the 1988 Basel Committee meeting and, despite
strong opposition from other countries, succeeded in foisting the higher standards
onto all members by a revision of the Concordat.42
The move was subsequently justified primarily in technical terms. Higher capital
adequacy requirements, the committee reasoned, would “strengthen stability” since
capital in international banks was being eroded at a time crises were increasing.43
Since the directive was worded in the language of neoliberalism – the move was
projected to eliminate “competitive inequality arising from differences in national
capital requirements”44 – even the ‘secondary’ motive of maintaining the
competitiveness of US banks became more palatable.
This victory was important because it introduced finance trends that were to
characterise regulatory initiatives in subsequent years. First, it showed that global
39
40
41

42
43

44

The latter alone cost the government some 151 billion dollars in bailout packages. Supra note 25.
Accordingly, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve set minimum
capital requirements for the multinational banks. Id.
GILPIN, supra note 3, at2 75. This is because banks subject to higher capital adequacy requirements
have less money to lend than those with lower CARs. This, of course, means that the better
capitalised banks make less profit than the others.
GILPIN, supra note 3.
Interestingly, the implementation of the higher capitalisation requirements subverted the touted
objective of stability. The prescribed capital adequacy ratio for short-term loans was a significantly
lower two per cent of outstanding loans. As a corollary to this directive, most banks started
focusing on short-term lending which, apart from the economic detriment (economic growth
usually accompanies long-term, productive investments) also introduced more volatility into the
banking system through an increase in speculative activities and time mismatches between assets
and liabilities of borrowers (that is, loans would typically mature before the investments). Supra
note 34.
Supra note 34.
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regulation could be tailored to address localised concerns. Secondly, a proposal
for raising the bar – regardless of the motivation behind it or its demonstrated
efficacy – could always be presented as inherently beneficial and impartial advice.
Thirdly, the opposition could always be disarmed by citing safety-related issues.
‘Best practice’ was no normative ideal and financial regulation was rapidly evolving
into a technique of power that was cloaked in seeming neutrality.
These trends were revisited during the development of anti-money laundering
regulation. According to Braithwaite and Drahos, money laundering occupies
the top priority in the US scheme of globalised financial regulation.45 The authors
attribute this enthusiasm to the “domestic priority of tackling the drug trade and
the political attractions of blaming foreigners”.46 Further, they suggest that money
laundering has historically served as a convenient – if ‘coincidental’ – catchall for
“national security objectives” as well as foreign policy imperatives.47 But during
the 1980s, most countries did not seem overly excited about devising anti-money
laundering measures,48 certainly not enough to initiate regulation. The USA pushed
the topic onto the Basel Committee as a subject worthy of regulation and eventually
drafted the Basel Statement of Principles on Money Laundering (approved by the
committee in 1988).49
45

46

47

48

49

BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 1, at 105. Money laundering outranks uniform accountancy
standards, harmonising tax, macroeconomic policy coordination and even capital adequacy for
banks, something the authors find “somewhat shocking”. BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 1,
at 142. Compliance with money laundering standards is more strictly monitored than other
financial standards. BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 1, at 106. Interestingly, however,
Delaware, Nevada and Montana in the US are still the biggest money laundering havens in the
world. JEFFREY ROBINSON, THE SINK 328 (2003).
“The realist edge is that the US state gets domestic political kudos by painting the drug problem
as a foreign conspiracy to corrupt the US that must be fought as a war.” BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS,
supra note 1, at 105, 391.
The war on drugs was a convenient weapon against General Noriega and his ilk while the CIA
“has an interest in being a major launderer of dirty money itself, while making it harder for the
competition to do so.” BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 1, at 105. According to the authors,
a consequence of the militarization of the war on drugs under Nixon, Reagan and Bush was that
“drug interdiction was subordinate to the foreign policy goal to the defeat of communism”.
BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 1, at 390. Post 9/11, the comparable foreign policy objective
would probably be the defeat of terrorism.
Braithwaite & Drahos cite FATF figures stating that up until 1990, only six countries had chosen
to model the US practice of declaring money laundering a specific criminal offence. BRAITHWAITE
& DRAHOS, supra note 1, at 105.
BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 1, at 106. Significantly, the Basel principles predate the UN
Vienna Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.
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The Oyster of ‘the Global Regulator’50
The Regulatory Web
At the global level, responsibility for the creation of rules and standards is assigned
to several different organisations. The Basel Committee handles banking
supervision; the International Organisation of Securities Commissioners (IOSCO)
looks at securities and companies regulation; and the OECD-based Financial Action
Task Force (FATF) deals with money laundering. Even so, the lines of responsibility
are not as clear as in multilateral lending or international trade as these agencies
are not discrete ‘legislative’ units.
The Basel Committee may have the banking portfolio but the WTO’s General
Agreement on Trade in Services plays a growing role in financial sector issues as
do regional treaty arrangements such as the European Union.51 The Basel
Committee is actively involved in both derivatives and money laundering regulation
but a logical banking sub-field, the regulation of systemically important payments,
lies with the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI), earlier
known as the Committee on Payments and Settlements System (CPSS).52 IOSCO
is responsible for securities and companies and regulates securities settlements
systems with the CPMI, but the corporate governance rules are drafted by the
OECD.53 The IMF and the World Bank, meanwhile, look on approvingly.Global
financial regulation is thus “a dense web of influences”54 with multiple regulators
for most areas.
50
51

52

53
54

With apologies to Shakespeare for the liberty taken with his Merry Wives of Windsor.
Although the WTO plays no role in setting domestic financial regulatory standards, the freetrade principles of the GATS may influence how other international organisations and standardsetting bodies devise international standards of financial regulation. Meanwhile, the EU regulatory
system has also come up with minimum harmonised standards for prospectuses for initial public
offerings, market abuse, and insider trading, as well as money laundering. ALEXANDER ET AL.,
supra note 5, at 9-10.
Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS,
http://www.bis.org/cpmi. The bifurcation is interesting because till 2009, the CPSS comprised
the same set of members as the Basel Committee – the G10 central bankers. Delonis, supra note
23, at 590. In 2009, the list of members was expanded to 25, including, notably, Brazil, Russia,
India and South Africa.
List of Standards, Codes, and Principles, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/
external/standards/scnew.htm
I owe the phrase to BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 1, at 13.
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This is problematic because the institutional overlap makes it impossible to hold
a single agency responsible for any piece of regulation. Further, while the
multiplicity of regulatory institutions implies a ‘many voices’ approach to
regulation – an indication of diversity and inherent salubriousness – the practice
on ground sharply contradicts such notions. The global regulatory convergence
project was conceived in response to the demand of global capital for harmonisation
across jurisdictions and markets. As such, the ‘replicatory’ efforts need to be seen
for the mutually legitimising exercises that they are.
Governance Structures
“The epistemic community that steers financial regulation is a community of the
North.”55 Nowhere is this clearer than in the institutional structures of the
regulatory agencies, and the Basel Committee is again a good example. As the
USA unilaterally commandeered the agenda at Basel, the committee too assumed
the mantle of global regulator/supervisor/standard-setter. In 1990, the Basel
Committee issued a supplement to the 1983 Concordat to improve the flow of
prudential information between supervisors “globally”56 – not just between the
G-10. In 1992, certain principles of the Concordat were reformulated as “Minimum
Standards”, which other supervisors were subsequently “invited to endorse”.57 In
1998, the Basel Committee amended the Concordat to make it applicable to all
countries where banks conducted cross-border operations.58
Also worth remembering is that till 2009, the committee comprised the G10+359
central bank governors and national bank regulators. It can thus be seen as nonrepresentative and unaccountable on two counts. First, it excluded participation
by other countries; to date, membership can only be acquired via invitation, and
potential members are judged based on how important their national system is to
55
56
57
58
59

BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 1, at 123.
Supra note 34.
Supra note 34.
Supra note 34.
Present membership comprises 28 jurisdictions: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada,
China, EU, France, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg,
Mexico, the Netherlands, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, UK and the USA. Membership, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS,
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/membership.htm.
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international financial stability.60 Secondly, given the emphasis on the need for
‘independent’ central banks, the members are unaccountable to even those within
their domestic jurisdictions.
Although the committee has tried to involve non-member countries in various
aspects of the standard setting process,61 this involvement has remained limited to
consultation and “the actual decision making remains controlled by the G10
countries”.62 The coterie is renowned for their “secretive” decision-making and
over-reliance on “personal contacts”.63 Given its exclusivity as well as the lack of a
mandate from other countries, the committee, strictly speaking, has no business
devising rules for the world. But the committee located a mandate for itself in a
“communiqué issued by the G7 Heads of State in 1997 that encourage[d] emerging
economies to adopt ‘strong prudential standards’ and ‘effective supervisory
structures’. The Committee … interpreted the G7 communiqué as authority for
it to devise global capital standards and other core principles of prudential
regulation for all economies where international banks operate[d].”64 Even so, this
is unsatisfactory and insufficient authority for an agency that affects the lives of
the non-G10 countries as well. First, the regulatory initiative came from the G7,
not the emerging markets that were supposed to implement the same. Secondly,
the G7 effectively delegated an authority they did not possess.65
The securities markets are also beset with similar issues. The International
Organisation of Securities Commissioners (IOSCO) began in 1974 as an interAmerican regional association.66 The decision to go global was taken by the 11
North and South American members in 1983. The new organisation was intended
as a forum for the world’s regulators to meet, discuss and agree on policies and
60
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Charter, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/charter.htm.
This has been through the establishment of a Core Principles Liaison Group comprising 13 nonG10 countries (including India, Brazil, Russia and China) as well as by establishing “close relations”
with regional bank supervisory groupings such as the Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors.
Supra note 34.
ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 5, at 42
ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 5, at 37.
ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 5, at 38.
That the separation between initiating and creating regulation further dilutes accountability is
another matter altogether.
History, INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION OF SECURITIES COMMISSION, http://www.iosco.org/about/
?subsection=about_iosco.
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best practices. While IOSCO ranks higher than the Basel Committee on the
democratic scale – it boasts 200 members from more than 110 countries67 — it too
is still learning democratic decision-making. Up until 2012, for example, the task
of determining regulatory priorities and devising standards fell to the lot of the
IOSCO Technical Committee, which featured only 15 regulators from the world’s
most developed securities markets including the G10.68 While all members were
provided with the opportunity to voice their concern on all proposals, “most of
the practical bargaining and shaping of issues” took place in closed-door Technical
Committee meetings.69 Significantly, the meetings are off-limits for even other
IOSCO members. While all members were entitled to vote on proposals, in
practice, the decision of the Technical Committee was final. This was not only
because of the expertise of its members but also because of the fact that the issues
raised concerned the world’s leading financial markets.70
In 2012, the standard-setting functions of the Technical Committee were taken
over by the IOSCO Board, which features regulators from 34 jurisdictions
including several from the global South. But there is little to show whether – and
to what extent – decision-making is responding to the changes in governance
structures.
The FATF is similarly cliquish. It was established by the leaders of the G7 and the
president of the European Commission in 1989. Boasting a total of 16 members
drawn from the G7, the EC and eight other countries, FATF was to combat the
perceived threat posed by money laundering to financial stability.71Although the
number of members has since increased to 36, the global South is underrepresented
while the OECD contingent dominates.72 This is significant primarily because the
67
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IOSCO’s current membership list includes 200 ordinary, affiliate, and associate members.
Membership, INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION OF SECURITIES COMMISSION, http://www.iosco.org/
about/pdf/IOSCO-Fact-Sheet.pdf.
ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 5, at 58. For an exhaustive treatment of IOSCO’s institutional
structure, see ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 5.
ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 5, at 59.
ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 5, at 59.
Regulations, F INANCIAL ACTION TASK F ORCE, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/
historyofthefatf.
Interestingly, one of the criteria for membership listed on the FATF website is that the country
be of “strategic importance”. There is no explication as to what constitutes strategic importance,
Members and Observers, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/membersandobservers.
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agency claims the regulatory ambit to safeguarding the global financial system
from money laundering and terrorist financing but has neitherthe representation
nor a mandate to match.73
Enforcement
The issue of enforcement should technically not arise. Global finance is governed
primarily by international soft law. As “legally non-binding standards, principles
and rules that influence and shape state behaviour but do not fit into the traditional
categories of public international law and bi- or multilateral treaties”,74 soft law –
unlike ‘hard’ law – does not imply obligation.75 By definition then, soft law
precludes both enforcement and penalties for breach.76
Consequently, all the agencies referred to stress the ‘voluntary’ nature of their
“recommendations”, “guidelines” or “principles”. The Basel Committee, for
example, insists that it does not have any “formal supranational supervisory
authority” and that itformulates its recommendations in the expectation that
individual national authorities will implement them.77
However, as Lichtenstein argues, the characterisation of a particular norm
embedded in a regulatory regime as either ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ does not matter. What
matters instead is “the process of obtaining effectiveness …, the methodology of
better international dealings and cooperation”.78 And this seems to be the approach
taken by the regulators.
On the face of it, the Basel Committee’s emphasis on the role of “individual
authorities” and decentralised implementation of standards – one echoed by both
IOSCO and FATF79 – suggests that the “process for obtaining effectiveness” or
73
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The mandate for 2012-2020 was endorsed only by its members. Final Mandate, FINANCIAL
ACTION TASK FORCE, http://www.fatfgafi.org/topics/fatfgeneral/documents ministersrenewthe
mandateofthefinancialactiontaskforceuntil2020.html.
ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 5, at 59.
Quote attributed to Sir Joseph Gold in Cynthia Crawford Lichtenstein, Hard Law v. Soft Law:
Unnecessary Dichotomy?, 36 INT’L LAW.1433 (2001).
Id.
Supra note 34 (emphasis added).
Supra note 75, at 1440.
Objectives and Principles for Securities Regulation, INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION OF SECURITIES
COMMISSIONS, http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD154.pdf.
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regulatory convergence depends on national regulators. Since there are ostensibly
no penalties for non-compliance and domestic implementation is necessary to give
force to the standards, the decision whether or not to implement the global
standards seems to rest squarely on the shoulders of national regulators.
Contradicting this assumption, however, are the vigorous mainstreaming80 exercises
conducted by these agencies. The Basel Committee, for example, engages in extensive
monitoring of member compliance81 and confesses to “constantly exploring the
mechanics of enforcing [its] standards”.82 By their own admission, IOSCO and
FATF are also similarly occupied.
This mainstreaming is further enhanced by the official sector. Since the demise of
the Bretton Woods system, the IMF has slowly but consistently been mapping
new areas of operations for itself. At present, the Fund describes its core activities
as lending, surveillance, providing technical assistance, economic research and
statistics,83 and development of standards and codes.84 However, of the standards
and codes deployed in 12 key areas, the IMF authors just three.85 In the other
areas, the IMF simply endorses the standards developed by other private
sector agencies such as the Basel Committee, IOSCO, FATF, CPMI, OECD,
International Accounting Standards Board, IAIS and International Federation of
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The term here refers to a subtle form of coercive enforcement conducted by popularising the use
of the prescribed standards and codes.
ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 5, at 37.
Supra note 34.
What the IMF Does, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/work.htm.
The 12 “key” areas of operations are anti-money laundering and the combating of terrorism,
accounting, auditing, banking supervision, corporate governance, data dissemination, fiscal
transparency, insolvency and creditor rights, insurance supervision, monetary and financial
policy transparency, payments systems, and securities regulation. Reports on the Observance of
Standards and Codes, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/np/rosc/
rosc.asp.
These include data dissemination; fiscal policy transparency and monetary and fiscal policy
transparency. Interestingly, even the Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and
Financial Policies was developed in conjunction with the Basel Committee, the Center for Latin
American Monetary Studies (CEMLA), CPSS, European Central Bank, International Association
of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), International Finance Corporation, IOSCO, OECD and the
World Bank. Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies,
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/np/mae/mft.
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Accountants.86 With the IMF as “principal enforcement agent”87 then, the standards
and codes authored by these agencies work their way into the fabric of all
international economic transactions and relationships.88 This technique of
enforcement operates within the official sector as well as at the level of the market.89
Within the IMF, these standards and codes are a crucial component of four of its
five functions. First, the IMF usually works in almost all of its officially supported
standards and codes into its loan agreements with states.90 The Basel standards, for
example, are “routinely” part of loan packages and compliance was a condition on
at least seven of the loan arrangements made to East Asian countries after the 1997
crisis.91 The IOSCO standards were similarly prescribed for at least one country92.
Further, in some cases, compliance with standards such as those of the Basel
Committee is a prequalification for IMF loans.93 In others, compliance is a
guarantee of better terms on the next loan.94
Secondly, and perhaps most importantly in the context of the relation between
standard-setting states and standard-receiving ones, the standards and codes are at
the heart of IMF surveillance operations. In 1977, surveillance of the “general
economic situation and policy strategy of each member country”95 became a key
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List of Standards, Codes and Principles Useful for Bank and Operational Work and for which
Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes are Produced, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/standards/scnew.htm. For an interesting discussion of
the origins of the standards, see Delonis, supra note 23. “The fact that these standards come from
sources other than the IMF could theoretically pose a problem because the Fund generally
prohibits cross-conditionality with the objectives of other organizations; however, as IMF General
Counsel Francois Gianviti has stated, ‘If the Fund concludes . . . that certain reforms need to be
made to give effect to its own purposes, the fact that these actions will give effect to other treaties
. . . cannot bar the Fund from making them a condition of its financial assistance’”. Delonis,
supra note 23, at 597.
Delonis, supra note 23, at 595.
Delonis, supra note 23, at 623-4.
Delonis, supra note 23, at 95-6.
Delonis, supra note 23, at 597.
Delonis, supra note 23, at 598-601, 603.
Delonis, supra note 23, at 598-601.
ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 5, at 39.
Delonis, supra note 23, at 612.
IMF Surveillance Fact Sheet, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/
np/exr/facts/surv.htm.
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part of IMF operations. In 1995, the IMF began its “data dissemination” work.96
But the most significant was the Financial Sector Assessment Programme (FSAP),
which was launched in 1999 in conjunction with the World Bank. With the
“soundness of financial systems” as its aim, the FSAP seeks to determine the strength
of a country’s financial system, the quality of its regulatory and supervisory
framework as well as its ability to manage and resolve financial crises and
accordingly dispense country-specific macro and micro prudential
recommendations.97 The programme hinges on “detailed assessments” of the extent
of a country’s compliance with financial sector standards and codes.98 Not only
are these assessments published as Reports on Observance of Standards and Codes
(ROSCs), the FSAP also provides the groundwork for the Financial Sector
Stability Assessments in which IMF staff address issues such as the stability of the
financial sector and its potential contribution to growth.99
This has two significant implications. First, since the Basel Committee/IOSCO/
FATF – agencies with even less political legitimacy than the IMF itself – conceive
these standards in the first place, in effect, it is they who decide whether a financial
system is ‘sound’ or otherwise. Secondly, one sees the meticulous construction of
a multi-layered edifice, where each subsequent layer is validated by the one
preceding it and all rest on the base of standards and regulations.
Thirdly, the standards also have a bearing on the technical assistance function.
Requests for technical assistance by some developing countries are a corollary to
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This comprises the General Data Dissemination System (approved by the IMF Board of
Directors in 1997), which is aimed at all members and provides “recommendations of good
practice” for the production and dissemination of macroeconomic and financial data (including
the real, fiscal, financial and external sectors) as well as socio-demographic data (population,
health, education, poverty). The Special Data Dissemination System (approved in 1996), on the
other hand, targets those countries having or seeking access to international capital and prescribes
specific macroeconomic and financial standards that must be adhered to. Other tools include
Special Data Dissemination Plus and Data Quality Reference Site. General Data Dissemination
System, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, http://dsbb.imf.org/Applications/web/gdds/
gddswhatgdds.
Financial Sector Assessment Program, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/
external/np/fsap/fssa.aspx.
Supporting Documents Country FSP’s, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/
external/np/fsap/fsap.asp.
Fact Sheet- The Financial Sector Assessment Program, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, http://
www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/fsap.htm.
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the surveillance process.100 Through the means of short-term staff missions, longer
term ‘expert placement’, training courses, workshops and additional staff reports
among others,101 technical assistance helps countries cope with the specific problem
of non-compliance102 as identified by the FSAPs. This point is critical because it
speaks of convergence as an end in itself, not as a possible cure for other
consequences that may flow from non-compliance.
In November 2002, for example, the IMF added the FATF recommendations to
its list of standards and codes. Along with the World Bank, the IMF then
“substantially increased” technical assistance available to those countries looking
to strengthen financial, regulatory, and supervisory frameworks for anti-money
laundering and the combating of terrorism.103 As such, the IMF and the World
Bank can be seen as the prime instruments of regulatory convergence.104
That said, the importance of the market cannot be underestimated. A study of
enforcement practices at the level of the market not only indicates the depth of
mainstreaming, it also shows how the market functions as an IMF amplifier. While
some commercial banks insist on IMF conditionality as a precondition to lending
to states, the debt ‘clubs’ usually insist on an “IMF clause” in their agreements
with countries.105 Many private financial institutions and investors base investment
decisions on IMF surveillance data.106 As a result, the publication of compliance
data brings to bear an inordinate amount of pressure on a non-compliant state107
looking to the international financial markets for funds. Studies show that states
100 Delonis, supra note 23, at 571.
101 Technical Assistance and Training INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/
external/np/exr/facts/tech.htm
102 This is substantiated by Braithwaite & Drahos’ assertion that capacity building by the IFIs tends
to focus on the “transplant” of regulatory models from one state to another and does not address
the more pertinent issue of building the capacity to manage those systems. BRAITHWAITE &
DRAHOS, supra note 1, at 138.
103 The IMF and the Fight Against Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism, INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/aml.htm.
104 BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 1, at 115; ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 5, at 36.
105 Pahuja, supra note 14, at 765, 749.
106 Delonis, supra note 23, at 609. Delonis cites the specific examples of Price waterhouse Coopers
and the California Public Employees Retirement System.
107 Delonis, supra note 23, at 595-6. In a similar vein, Braithwaite & Drahos recount the example of
how the US and UK coerced countries into complying with capital adequacy standards in 1987
by linking compliance with entry to their markets and threatening “inefficient financial regulatory
systems” with the “spectre” of loss of business. BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 1, at 132.
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with better compliance have lower debt risk premiums and that the publication
of ROSCs has a significant bearing on sovereign credit ratings.108 Given the
widespread interest in IMF data, even states use compliance as a ‘signalling device’
to potential trading partners and international investors in order to attract trade
and investment.109
Accountability For None?
The combined operation of the regulatory web, the institutional structures of the
agencies and the enforcement mechanisms makes assigning responsibility – and
the locating of specific interests – within this diverse set a Herculean task. There
is, of course, the issue of multiplicity. Take the example of the Know Your
Customer (KYC) regulation. The regulation has long been an integral part of the
Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision110 and the FATF guidelines
elaborate on the same in great detail.111 Meanwhile, both the Basel principles and
the FATF guidelines are used in the IMF’s ROSCs.112 Today, KYC procedures
are a key requirement of most central banks and are accordingly woven into the
domestic legislative or regulatory fabric. But no single regulatory body can be
held accountable, or even responsible, for the regulation.113
Equally interesting are the issues of agency, both between the ‘global’ and the
‘local’ and within the global web. On the one hand, the emphasis on the ‘voluntary’
nature of the standards not only sets up a false dichotomy between the global and
the local,114 it further imputes to the state/domestic regulators a degree of autonomy
108 Delonis, supra note 23, at 610-1
109 Delonis, supra note 23, at 611.
110 The explanatory notes to the 25 principles justify the regulation by claiming that even “inadvertent”
association with “drug traders and other criminals” can undermine public confidence in banks
and damage the bank’s reputation. The notes also recommend reference to FATF guidelines for
a more thorough treatment of how to implement KYC procedures: Core Principles for Banking
Supervision, BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs30a.pdf.
111 Regulations, FINANCIAL A CTION TASK F ORCE, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/document/27/
0,2340,en_32250379_32236920_33965659_1_1_1_1,00.html
112 Standards and Codes, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/standards/
index.htmaccessed.
113 This statement is supported by Braithwaite & Drahos’ assertion that histories of globalisation
are complex and cannot be understood in terms of the agency of single actors using single
mechanisms. BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 1, at 31.
114 On the convergence of the national and global, see generally Sassen and Picciotto. Sassen refers
to the process as the “blurring of duality” between the national and global, state and non-state,
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which is not evidenced by the workings of the global political economy. ‘State’
power is constituted by and helps constitute webs of regulatory influences
comprising many actors wielding many mechanisms to achieve globalisation.115
To paraphrase Santos, the world system, operating at the supra-state level, develops
its own systemic law. This is superimposed on the national law of the individual
states across the world system.116 Perceiving financial regulation as essentially
‘domestic’ is thus untenable. On the other hand, the global web of regulation and
the various interests it represents preclude the possibility of identifying a single
omnipotent agency or state. “A community of the North” is as close as one can
get to isolating a specific interest.

CONCLUSION
The subprime crisis of 2007 showed that even the most stringent regulation is not
enough to protect the global economy from the impact of financial crises in
interconnected financial markets. Since the crisis arose in the most developed
jurisdictions – with arguably the best-regulated markets – the calls for increasing
regulation are now being met with a healthy dose of scepticism. The less developed
markets that stand to acquire a hefty regulatory burden are now arguing that it’s
not their mess and they shouldn’t have to clean it up, that too at such a high cost
to themselves.
Against this backdrop, the ‘democratic deficit’ in the devise and spread of global
financial regulation underscores the need to interrogate both the substance as well
as the aims of global financial regulation. The norms of transparency and
accountability essential to good governance are severely lacking in the global
financial regulation project. Recent scholarship has stripped economic regulation
of its apolitical, technical pretensions and discovered a disturbing proclivity towards
colonial domination through economic means.117 How different is financial regulation?
private and public in ministries of finance, central banks and specialised technical regulatory
agencies while Picciotto speaks of the “fragmentation of the public sphere” as giving rise to
“systems of layered governance based on regulation.” See Saskia Sassen, The Participation of
States and Citizens in Global Governance, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 5 (2003); Picciotto,
supra note 20.
115 BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 1, at 31.
116 BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARDS A NEW LEGAL COMMON SENSE 67 (2002).
117 For accounts of the debilitating impact of neo-colonialism on the South, see generally Appadurai,
Anghie, Pahuja and Picciotto.
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